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 1 
Introduction 
 
The last ten years have seen a remarkable resurgence of interest in international 
organizations, treaties, and law among international relations scholars.  A large part of the 
attention has been focused on institutional design.  The modal study of international treaties 
typically examines one feature of treaties, e.g., one kind of clause, in a universe or sample of 
treaties.  Koremenos (2005), for example, takes a random sample of treaties from the United 
Nations Treaty Series and looks for the existence or not of clauses regarding renewal. 
 
In this paper we address the fact – evident to practicing lawyers – that international 
treaties often form more or less tightly integrated “treaty complexes,” which we can call 
“institutions.”  Entities like “international organizations” are often in reality a treaty complex:  in 
a real sense international organizations are constituted by treaties.  The usual criteria for coding 
an international organization include treaties, organizational arrangements (e.g., secretariat), and 
regularized meetings.  However, usually the organizational and meetings criteria themselves are 
based on treaty documents.  Once we begin to think of international institutions and 
organizations as treaty complexes, a new research agenda arises:  attention to (1) the evolution of 
institutions/organizations as new treaties are signed and (2) the relationship between and among 
treaties.  Cross-sectional analyses of institutions or organizations do not get at these questions 
largely because the research design does not allow them to be addressed. 
 
We are interested in examining an important dimension of the inter-treaty relationship, 
that between bilateral and multilateral treaties.  As a matter of statistical fact most treaties signed 
by states, roughly two-thirds to three-quarters, are bilateral.
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  As a political fact, the most 
important treaties and organizations are multilateral.  Meanwhile, as an empirical fact the world 
has seen a dramatic increase in bilateral treaty making since 1989.  Hence the relationship 
between large numbers of bilateral agreements and the more visible multilateral ones assumes 
mounting contemporary political importance. 
 
One way to think of the bilateral-multilateral treaty relationship is via the concepts of 
complementarity and substitutability.  A bilateral treaty complements a multilateral treaty when 
it amplifies, specifies, or implements the terms of that document.  A bilateral treaty substitutes 
when it replaces a possible multilateral treaty.  As discussed below, the Russian state could 
potentially sign a number of bilateral security treaties with bordering states instead of one 
multilateral treaty with them all, or it could sign both multilateral and bilateral treaties with its 
neighbors to address regional security issues. The former situation indicates a situation of 
substitutability, as a number of individual bilateral treaties stand in place of one multilateral 
agreement.  Meanwhile, the latter suggests complementarity, as bilateral and multilateral treaties 
combine to form a security treaty complex.  In other work (Powers and Goertz, 2006), we have 
found that in Africa states have moved almost exclusively to the multilateral management of 
security affairs via various regional economic institutions (REIs). This suggests that African 
governments have substituted multilateral treaties for bilateral ones.  
We refer to the complementarity of bilateral and multilateral treaties as nested 
bilateralism.  We hypothesize that governments use bilateral treaties that are "nested" within 
                                                 
1
 For example, 69.9% of Barbara Koremenos's sample of treaties (2005) is bilateral. 
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larger multilateral frameworks.  Such nested bilateral treaties serve two functions for individual 
states.  First, because multilateral treaties are often quite general in nature, bilateral treaties can 
be used to translate general policy decisions into specific actions.  The second function of 
bilateral agreements is that they provide flexibility in addressing focused or technical concerns.  
Instead of a detailed multilateral treaty that covers all of the specifics for all signatory states, the 
bilateral treaty allows the two signatory states a means of dealing with the specifics of their 
interests, conditions, and needs.  Thus, nested bilateralism permits individual states a great deal 
of flexibility in implementing policy ends that are set out in often broad-ranging multilateral 
agreements. 
At a fundamental level, multilateral and bilateral treaties can be linked in three possible 
ways, making nested bilateralism a more nuanced phenomenon as states' interests are linked.  
We see nesting where bilateral treaties directly complement multilateral treaty outcomes and 
arrangements, with such bilateral agreements chronologically following already-constructed 
multilateral treaties.  In contrast, bilateral agreements can substitute for multilateral treaties, with 
new bilateral understandings replacing those earlier multilateral goals and outcomes.  In addition, 
as has proven evident in contemporary Africa, multilateral treaties can substitute for earlier 
bilateral agreements.  Depending upon the logic and content of these bilateral and multilateral 
treaties, this substitution could entail what we term anticipatory nesting, where earlier bilateral 
agreements anticipate outcomes and arrangements that will be built upon by a wider group of 
states via multilateral means. 
 
To explore the dynamics of contemporary nested bilateralism we analyze the security 
arrangements that have arise through the Eurasian treaty complex known as the Commonwealth 
of Independent States (CIS).  Using Ashley Leeds’s ATOP dataset (Leeds, Ritter, Mitchell, and 
Long, 2002), we can examine the relationship between CIS multilateral alliance and bilateral 
treaties of the 1992-2003 period for the range of member-states.  Given our thinking about treaty 
complementarity and substitutability we posit that, where states sign both bilateral and 
multilateral security agreements with the same state-partner, the relevant treaties are in fact 
complementary.  Conversely, the absence of one or the other treaty form suggests the signed 
treaties are substitutes.  While acknowledging that the relationships among bilateral and 
multilateral treaties may be nuanced, with the theoretical possibility of a more expansive content 
for a bilateral treaty than a relevant multilateral agreement, our bilateral-multilateral study 
highlights the nested bilateralism of the CIS treaty complex. 
In its 15-plus years of existence, the 12 former Soviet Union (FSU) states that have 
comprised the CIS signed hundreds of treaties dealing with a wide range of issues.  Among 
these, we are especially interested in agreements addressing security concerns, and in other work 
we have identified 53 CIS treaties with an explicit security focus (Willerton and Beznosov, 
2007).  We examine these CIS security treaties, augmenting our examination with an analysis of 
the bilateral security agreements crafted by two CIS members, Russia and Turkmenistan.  While 
we are naturally interested in the multilateral and bilateral security arrangements that engage the 
most powerful CIS member, Russia, we consider security agreements involving one of the CIS's 
most skeptical members, self-isolating Turkmenistan.  Our long-term desire is to analyze a 
diversity of FSU-CIS bilateral relationships, spanning highly engaged states such as Belarus and 
Kazakhstan to more cautious states such as Ukraine and Uzbekistan, but we begin here with 
analysis of one focused bilateral relationship, Russia-Turkmenistan.  We illuminate nested 
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bilateralism in the FSU-CIS setting by juxtaposing the bilateral security arrangements involving 
these two states with the broader regional security arrangements crafted through the CIS. 
 
Dynamics of treaty nesting 
 
International treaties can interconnect in a variety of ways.  The “nesting” of treaties or 
regimes is one relationship that has received much attention by international relations scholars 
(e.g., Aggarwal, 1998; note the overlap between institutions is a related relationship receiving 
attention).  While the image of nesting is clear, the exact substantive nature of the nesting is 
often less clear.  Our analysis involves an investigation of related kinds of nesting, including 
both (1) specification and (2) implementation.  By specification we mean a treaty further 
developing or amplifying the intended goals and or arrangements of an existent agreement; e.g., 
a bilateral friendship and cooperation agreement further advancing the goals of collective 
security set out in a multilateral security treaty.  By implementation we mean a treaty actualizing 
or operationalizing the organizational or policy measures set out in an existent agreement; e.g., a 
treaty detailing the structure and rules of a secretariat that was created in an earlier agreement). 
 
Implicit in the idea of nested treaties is the notion that the level B treaty builds upon -- 
while not exceeding -- the fundamental substantive content of the level A treaty within which it 
is embedded.  In this sense nesting is like subsetting.  The nested treaty can explicate or provide 
details about the level A treaty.  It can also enhance or provide details on the implementation of 
the level A treaty. 
 
This relationship is not mysterious but arises from the practical issues of policy 
legislation (specification) and implementation.  While some laws try to micromanage, 
administrative guidelines typically provide many of the actual rules needed to put the general 
wording of the law into practice.  Thus, the nested treaty B implements and expands upon the 
level A treaty.  It should remain faithful to the goals and terms of the higher-level treaty and 
should not stray into unrelated substantive areas.  Many of the treaties that constitute REIs are 
quite general in nature.  Hence there exists a significant scope for other treaties to complement 
them and to implement them. 
 
We focus on bilateral treaties as one mechanism for working out the specificities of more 
general multilateral agreements.  Much of the rational choice literature on institutions suggests 
flexibility is often as important as hand-tying in motivating state behavior; using bilateral treaties 
to implement multilateral ones offers an increased degree of flexibility for crafting agreements 
that fit the interests and problems of two actors who are parties to a broader multilateral 
arrangement.  This view of the bilateral–multilateral treaty relationship implies that the two 
treaty components are complementary, as the level B treaty provides the detail and implementing 
arrangements to more fully activate the level A. 
  
However, it is also possible for bilateral treaties to be used in what we would call an 
inverted nested fashion.  States may want a stronger agreement than is possible within a 
multilateral forum.  Much of the literature on international institutions suggests that often a final 
multilateral document reflects a lowest common denominator logic as states promote their 
agendas and settle for less than they optimally desire (e.g., Downs et al., 1996).  Where such is 
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the case, a bilateral agreement can prove useful as it is stronger and more binding than a 
multilateral one.  Here the nesting is in the opposite sense, since in content the multilateral treaty 
is a subset of the stronger bilateral agreement. 
 
Our definition of nesting thus involves several related ideas.  First, if a treaty implements 
or specifies another treaty, it is nested within that treaty.  Second, if a treaty has stronger 
requirements, it is a higher level treaty.  We can think, then, of nesting in terms of legal priority.  
We assume that the treaty with the strongest terms is the dominant (i.e., level A) agreement.  
Such “best-shot” logic has long been used by the Correlates of War project for multiple military 
alliances.  Coding type of alliance when there are multiple treaties, the project coded the 
strongest one as overriding the weaker one. 
 
A caveat is in order as we develop and apply our thinking about treaty "nestedness" to the 
contemporary global system.  We have adopted a broad definition of nestedness, where we 
understand a level B treaty may exceed the fundamental substantive content of that level A treaty 
in which it is nested.  Complementarity here may include a fundamental extension or expansion 
beyond the content of the level A agreement.  Hence, level B treaties could in fact entail both (1) 
a concretization of another treaty's goals and potential and (b) a related expansion of policies and 
actions not explicitly anticipated in that other treaty's content.  Thus, an omnibus "friendship and 
cooperation agreement" (level A) could be consolidated and expanded upon through a focused 
bilateral treaty (level B) that goes into related but new areas.  We find a narrow definition of 
nestedness, where the level B treaty contains no measures or actions not laid out in the level A 
agreement, too confining and removed from the "real world" of bilateral and multilateral treaty 
construction. 
 
Given these considerations, we identify three types of treaty nestedness.  First, there is a 
straightforward and direct nestedness, where a level B treaty (likely bilateral) is fully embedded 
in the substantive content of a level A treaty (likely multilateral).  Second, there is partial 
nestedness, where a level B treaty (likely bilateral) has components drawn from one or more 
already-existent treaties, potentially has components not found in existent treaties, but is not 
completely embedded in some other single treaty.  Partial nestedness clearly can entail a number 
of possibilities regarding the content of a treaty, the principle logic being that such a treaty is 
only partially embedded in any other treaty(s).  Third, there is anticipatory nestedness, where a 
more focused or substantively limited treaty (likely bilateral) predates and anticipates the content 
of a subsequent treaty (likely multilateral).  In such a case, arrangements and policies are set out 
in one agreement (likely bilateral) that are engaged and even expanded upon in a subsequent 
treaty (likely multilateral).  To varying degrees in all three of these situations, one treaty is 
embedded in another. 
 
All three of these situations involved complementarity, but there could be a situation 
where bilateral treaties substitute for multilateral ones.  Instead of having a multilateral treaty 
with several countries, a government could pursue a strategy of bilateralism.  Major powers, in 
particular, have reason to prefer bilateral treaties since they can more successfully use their 
power superiority to advance their interests.  Nazi Germany, for instance, had a preference for 
bilateral economic agreements, with such advantages encouraging this negotiating approach.  
State calculations and preferences vary, and either bilateralism or multilateralism could be the 
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preferred route to advancing a state's goals.  Instead of forming NAFTA, the United States could 
have just signed two bilateral agreements with Canada and Mexico.  In other work we have 
found that African countries abandoned bilateral alliances for multilateral REI forums to deal 
with their security issues (Powers and Goertz, 2006).  It is important to understand why, when 
and to what extent governments pursue bilateralism versus multilateralism as we try to illuminate 
their foreign policy goals. 
 
While we focus on nesting within REIs, our analysis of complementarity versus 
substitutability also implies choices about nesting security within some more general purpose 
organization or creating new institutions for that function.  States could choose to nest security 
within general purpose regional organizations (e.g., REIs) or they could choose a non-nested 
strategy of creating separate military alliances.  In short, countries have a choice about whether 
to nest at various levels.  An examination of the FSU-CIS setting, with special attention to 
Russia's choices, permits us to consider such choices in a more focused and concrete way. 
 
Military alliances:  multilateral versus bilateral 
 
While there is a rapidly growing literature on nested international institutions (e.g., see 
the papers for the Princeton workshop on the topic, http://www.princeton.edu/~smeunier/ 
conference_nesting.htm), virtually no work deals with the possibility that security institutions 
and alliance treaties might exhibit nesting behavior.  The literature typically treats alliances as 
“stand-alone” and international security-relevant treaties as "isolated."  There is no sense in 
which alliances are treated as part of some sort of treaty complex.  Even rarer in the literature on 
institutions is the idea that security treaties might be nested within regional economic institutions 
(REIs). 
 
The issue of crafting bilateral versus multilateral institutions in addressing important 
foreign policy concerns cuts across all issue areas.  For example, in the trade sphere, the World 
Trade Organization has reported a dramatic surge in post-Cold War regional trade activity, with 
the rise in trade agreements massive (Crawford and Fiorentino, 2005).  In the 15 years since the 
end of the Cold War, there have been 10 times more RTA agreements (i.e., 257 agreements) 
signed than in the preceding 30 years of the Cold War (i.e., 25 agreements).  The vast majority of 
these trade treaties were bilateral.  The authors of the WTO report state that “RTAs are being 
embraced by many WTO members as trade policy instruments and in the best of cases, as 
complementary to MFN” (Crawford and Fiorentino 2005, 1).  Indeed, the hope is that, “in the 
best of cases,” these agreements are complements and not substitutes for the WTO. 
 
As a first cut at an analysis of nested bilateralism in the security area, we examine the 
relative number of bilateral and multilateral alliance treaties over time.  Table 1 tracks the 
development of multilateral versus bilateral alliance treaties since 1816, noting world totals, and 
totals for two major global powers, the U.S. and Russia.  The table also indicates what proportion 
of the total number of alliance treaties involved bilateral agreements.  The table reveals that one 
of the distinctive characteristics of the post–Cold War period has been the explosion of alliance 
treaties.  Approximately one-third of all alliance treaties crafted since 1816 were signed after 
1989.  Meanwhile, the vast majority of these post-Cold War treaties have been bilateral.  While 
there is more variation across the decades in the number of bilateral treaties, the strong tendency 
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in most decades for generating more bilateral treaties reflects the reality of heightened 
negotiation time, audience, transaction and actual finance costs of multilateral agreements. 
 
Given the vast number of bilateral alliance treaties and the few multilateral ones signed 
during the same period, one might suggest that bilateral alliance treaties are substituting for 
multilateral ones in the post–Cold War.  However, it is also possible that instead of substituting 
for multilateral treaties, these bilateral treaties are nested within the few more general 
multilateral ones already in place. In the area of the former Soviet Union (FSU), for example, in 
the period since the Soviet collapse, states' unilateral and regional security questions were 
addressed through both multilateral and bilateral means (Ivanov, 2002).  Security issues 
encompassed a complex range of issues, from broader strategic issues, to common infrastructural 
needs, and more concrete technical tasks.  While early CIS pronouncements and treaties 
addressed security issues, various security-relevant institutions and many dozens of treaties, 
protocols, and decisions were issued in the aftermath.  A varied set of divergent domestic and 
geo-strategic interests animated the negotiating positions and actions of the 12 non-Baltic FSU 
countries, but under the rubric of the CIS a set of common institutions and agreed-upon policies 
were crafted that represented an important component in all of these states' security structures.  
Meanwhile, these security arrangements must be placed in the broader context of FSU states' 
other bilateral arrangements (e.g., friendship and cooperation agreements).  Often more concrete 
and intrusive in the arrangements made and obligations incurred, these focused bilateral security 
agreements -- when combined with the broader structures and policy preferences set out in CIS 
treaties -- summed to form a more comprehensive and coherent security whole. 
 
Since there are relatively few multilateral alliance agreements created since 1989, we can 
examine them to see if they might lend themselves to bilateral nesting.  Table 2 lists all 
multilateral alliance treaties signed since 1989.  It is immediately evident from this list that 
almost all the treaties are not of the classic, realist power (threatening or balancing) type.  Rather, 
virtually all of these alliance treaties are part of some regional security or economic institution.  
These post-1989 multilateral security arrangements are much more about conflict management  
among members than they are about defending members against foreign attack.  Indeed among 
these treaties are important Eurasian agreements, including the all-important CIS and more 
recent entities such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.  While the CIS first arose with 
economic, infrastructural, and security concerns, its actions involving security primarily entailed 
managing issues among members.  Meanwhile, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization initially 
focused on economic concerns, with security interests arising subsequently and involving 
coordination of thinking and interests among members.  These “conflict-management alliances” 
fit our model for nested bilateralism, and one could easily imagine a series of associated bilateral 
alliance agreements emerging in their wake. 
 
Our approach to capturing cases of nested bilateralism is revealed by our treaty coding 
rules, as set out in the Appendix.  Given our definition of nested bilateralism, we rely on two 
rules to classify a bilateral treaty as nested within a multilateral one.  First, the substantive 
content of the two treaties, multilateral and bilateral, should be the same, and this is best 
determined by comparing the language of the two documents.  Second, both treaties should have 
at least one issue in common.  In the case of the organized ATOP military alliance treaties, the 
main substantive content is captured by the types of alliances that are specified in the 
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agreements.  For instance, the CIS Treaty on Collective Security covers three types of alliances:  
defense pact, nonaggression pact, and consultation pact.  As a consequence, a related or 
corresponding bilateral agreement that is nested in this CIS multilateral collective security 
document should cover at least one of these types of alliances.  At the same time, we would 
expect a bilateral treaty to provide details about multilateral treaties, including the 
implementation of those linked multilateral treaties.  Bilateral agreements nested in the CIS 
collective security document should include some indication of implementing steps or intentions. 
 
Figure 1 illustrates our expectations of a nested bilateral agreement, using a 1992 treaty 
of friendship and cooperation between Russia and the Central Asian state, Uzbekistan.  The 
figure provides detailed information, citing specific articles, drawn from the multilateral 1992 
CIS Treaty on Collective Security and this 1992 Russian-Uzbek bilateral friendship and 
cooperation instrument.  Lines with arrowheads link specific articles from the bilateral treaty 
back to specific articles in the multilateral CIS treaty.  The Russian-Uzbek document discusses 
nonaggression issues, the two signatories specifying that there are not only military-security 
pressures between the countries, but also economic and other types of pressures.  This bilateral 
document also addresses defense issues, with the parties specifying such matters as collaboration 
on defending borders, coordinating joint defense policies, and mutually refraining from any 
action targeted against the other signatory.  Comparable common measures involving 
consultation are also evident.  Juxtaposing these bilateral arrangements with those set out in the 
multilateral 1992 CIS Collective Security Treaty, we find all of these concerns and intentions 
explicitly stated.  In some cases, phrasing is almost identical.  This bilateral-multilateral nexus 
entails both (1) common issues and (2) similar (or the same) language. 
 
To examine our nested bilateralism hypothesis within a broader military alliance context, 
and looking beyond one bilateral relationship, we examine all multilateral and bilateral military 
alliances signed by CIS members found in the Atop database (Figure 2).  Figure 2 lists 
chronologically on the left side all of the multilateral alliances among CIS states, while on the 
right side are listed all of the bilateral alliance treaties in the ATOP dataset.  To the extent 
possible we have examined the texts of these bilateral alliance treaties for a comparative 
analysis.
2
 
 
The arrow-headed lines extending from bilateral to CIS multilateral treaties indicate that 
those bilateral agreements are nested within that multilateral agreement.  A perusal of the 
bilateral documents reveals that they are "omnibus" friendship and cooperation agreements that 
include a diversity of security-related concerns.  Summed together, they reveal concrete bilateral 
linkages tying Russia to all of the FSU-CIS members.  Many are nested in the first CIS 
multilateral document, the 1992 Treaty on Collective Security.  With the exception of one 
bilateral agreement (Russia-Armenia) that predates the CIS Collective Security Treaty, all of the 
bilateral treaties entail direct nestedness, with the bilateral agreement complementing the 
contents of that earlier CIS document.  Meanwhile, an even greater number of bilateral 
                                                 
2
 The ATOP database does not include all bilateral security treaties, as will become evident when we examine the 
Russia-Turkmenistan bilateral relationship.  However, it includes many of the most important bilateral agreements, 
and will suffice for our illustrative analysis.  Meanwhile, not all of the texts for the bilateral treaties listed in Figure 2 
were available to us as of the completion of this paper, and we have asterisked those for which we were missing the 
text. 
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agreements are nested in the 1993 CIS Charter, but the types of nestedness vary.  While nearly 
two-thirds of these bilateral treaties entail direct nestedness, approximately one-third entail 
anticipatory nestedness.  Many of these bilateral agreements include considerations not in the 
multilateral treaty, but the fundamental meaning and purpose of these bilateral agreements 
cannot be understood apart from the "partnered" multilateral.  Finally, while not evident from the 
direction of the arrows in Figure 2, a number of bilateral treaties involve partial nestedness, as 
the given documents include arrangements and intended outcomes not found in the linked 
multilateral treaty.  Notable is the 1997 Treaty on the Union between Belarus and Russia, a large 
document that spans a wide array of issues, including non-military matters, thus transcending the 
more limited foci of the 1992 Collective Security Treaty and the 1993 CIS Charter. 
 
Nested bilateralism in the CIS:  REIs as security institutions 
 
The previous section explored treaty activity involving one kind of security institution, 
military alliances.  We found that REIs or general purpose alliances such as the CIS have been 
constructed and substituted for classic threat-balancing military alliances.  In this section, we 
further explore the evolution of REIs as security institutions by considering in greater detail the 
Eurasian case of the CIS.  Consequently, the analysis is narrower in that it only looks at Russia 
and CIS member states.  But it is broader because we consider a wide range of security issues 
such as nonproliferation, nuclear weapons, and peacekeeping. 
 
Our goal in analyzing the FSU-CIS case is to see if bilateral treaties complement or 
substitute for multilateral ones in this large geographic setting.  Secondly, if the bilateral and 
multilateral treaties complement one another, are they nested with multilateral REI treaties?  We 
focus on Russia in particular as the dominant Eurasian and FSU regional power.  Much depends 
on the Russian view of REIs and bilateral treaties in general, hence we focus on the degree to 
which Russia has pursued a policy of nested bilateralism. 
 
The multilateral security arrangements developed under the aegis of the CIS have 
involved both (a) broad understandings of regional security and (b) more narrowly focused 
agreements addressing a wide variety of essentially technical needs (see Table 3).  These 
arrangements span a wide array of issue areas, with terrorism, conventional weapons and small 
arms, interstate war, ethnic and territorial disputes entailing the highest number of multilateral 
treaties.  All important security issues were immediately addressed via multilateral arrangements 
in 1992-93.  The all-important 1992 CIS Collective Security Treaty set out a general perspective 
on FSU regional security to which nearly all parties were agreed, and it was followed by 
numerous more narrowly crafted multilateral agreements that, while more detailed, were seldom 
signed and implemented by all members.  From the CIS’s earliest days, there was considerable 
concern about very strong multilateral institutional structures and opposition among many 
member-states toward the possible creation of a unified military command.  Indeed, even the 
attempts to further develop a CIS collective security concept that came after the 2001 U.S. attack 
on Afghanistan and destruction of the Taliban regime failed, leaving the region devoid of a full-
fledged collective defense system. 
 
Thus, throughout the CIS's existence most member-states have also actively developed 
bilateral security arrangements, based on the thinking that their security interests were better 
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advanced via separate agreements with relevant states, especially the regional power, Russia.  
This bilateralism, however, could be characterized as "narrow," given that CIS states strove for 
linkages that were self-contained, separated from other bilateral relationships, and not 
compromised in multilateral contexts (on "narrow" versus "extended bilateralism," see 
Ashizawa, 2003, Hoare, 2003, and Tow, 2003).  In the first years of the CIS's evolution there 
were relatively few signed bilateral security arrangements, as FSU states relied on 
multilateralism as a security paradigm.  But the "narrow" CIS bilateralism of the early post-
Soviet years, entailing an overwhelming preference for carefully monitored collective action, 
rather quickly gave way to growing numbers of bilateral security agreements that addressed an 
array of issues. 
 
The level of involvement of member-states in the CIS varied quite significantly.  The 
design of the CIS allowed states to “cherry-pick” when and where they want to engage in 
multilateral cooperation.  CIS operational rules included an "exit option" that permitted states to 
ignore or depart from any individual CIS agreement.  No agreements, even the most 
fundamental, were binding on all CIS members (see Welsh and Willerton, 1997).  One might 
hypothesize that the skeptics would prefer bilateral agreements to multilateral ones.  As we 
stressed above, bilateral treaties permit more flexibility and hence states only wanting limited 
regional cooperation might choose this form of cooperation.  It is also possible that some states 
avoid international legal commitments altogether.  Such “isolationist” states would prefer 
perhaps informal, tacit, and even perhaps secret deals between leaders to formal, public, legal 
arrangements. 
 
While an energetic member of the CIS, Russia also engaged CIS states through bilateral 
agreements.  We are still in the process of collecting and analyzing these bilateral treaties for a 
variety of CIS states, from those actively engaging multilateral and bilateral arrangements (e.g., 
Belarus and Kazakhstan) to those who are skeptical of such binding arrangements (e.g., 
Turkmenistan and Ukraine).  However, to date we have found 33 Russia-Kazakhstan and 8 
Russia-Turkmenistan bilateral security treaties, and they reveal careful policy calculations as 
both Russia and its neighbors construct their joint post-Soviet security architecture.  Having fully 
analyzed all of the Russia-Turkmenistan bilateral security agreements, we can report these two 
FSU states have identified a number of security issues in which they have constructed binding 
(and continuing) joint arrangements.  We can also report that a good number of these bilateral 
treaties are nested in broader CIS multilateral agreements.  Figure 3 illuminates these findings. 
 
The format of Figure 3 approximates that of Figure 2.  On the left side we list all relevant 
multilateral agreements in which Russia and Turkmenistan share membership.  On the right side 
we list all bilateral security agreements, with arrow-headed lines nesting the later with the 
former.  First, we find that Russian-Turkmen bilateral security agreements, all developed in the 
early post-Soviet period (1992-95), basically entailed three broad sets of concerns:  (1) anti-air 
defense, (2) military transit, and (3) material support for forces and personnel.  Four of these 
bilateral treaties "stood on their own," their contents revealing they were not nested in CIS 
multilateral treaties.  These treaties generally had rather narrow foci of substance, suggesting 
technical issues that the two countries preferred to address bilaterally.  The remaining 4 
documents can be tied to other CIS multilateral security treaties.  Indeed, in some cases the 
treaty's narrative contained explicit references to other CIS documents.   
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A review of  Figure 3 reveals examples of all three types of nestedness we have posited.  
First, four bilateral treaties involve direct nesting, with a 1995 bilateral agreement on interstate 
military transportations nested in both the 1992 CIS Council of Defense Ministers measures and 
the 1993 CIS multilateral treaty on interstate transports.  Three 1995 bilateral agreements are 
likewise directly nested in early CIS multilateral documents, the issue areas spanning military-
technical cooperation, anti-air defense, and military airport services.  Meanwhile, two bilateral 
treaties involve anticipatory nesting, as 1995 agreements on anti-air defense and on the provision 
of military airports anticipate 1996 CIS multilateral treaties that address these issues.  In 
addition, the two 1995 bilateral agreements just referred to also entail partial nesting, as their 
contents are subsumed by the more expansive CIS multilateral treaties that come a year later. 
 
In overviewing these 8 Russian-Turkmen treaties and placing them in a broader context, 
it is important to note they reflect cautious calculations on the part of a Turkmen regime that has 
generally remained distant from CIS arrangements and that has chosen a path of relative self-
isolation in the region.  Turkmenistan has been careful in engaging Russia, and interrelating 
these bilateral treaties with CIS multilateral arrangements reveals   For example, regarding anti-
air defense and broader collective security measures, Turkmenistan selectively engaged treaties:  
it did not sign the 1992 CIS Agreement about the Unified Armed forces for the transitional 
period and the 1996 CIS Agreement on normative documents for the creation and improvement 
of the unified system of anti-air defense of member-states, but about a year after signing the 
1996 bilateral arrangement with Russia on cooperation in anti-air defense, it did sign the 1996 
CIS Decision on the Concept of air defense of the CIS member-states. 
 
Summation 
 
The Commonwealth of Independent States was understood by many as a vessel for the 
smooth breakup of the USSR, but it proved to entail much more as its 12 member-states pursued 
their foreign and security policy agendas.  While some might view the CIS as a means for 
Russia's reassertion of regional power, others saw it has a multilateral means for member-states 
to advance their economic and security interests while concomitantly safeguarding their newly 
realized independence.  Our analysis of CIS treaty construction over a period of 15 years reveals 
the emergence of a Eurasian "treaty complex," with an interconnected and growing set of 
multilateral and bilateral agreements at the heart of the post-Soviet Eurasian security 
architecture.  All FSU states have struggled to advance their interests amidst the power shifts 
occasioned by the Soviet implosion, and they have proven quite active in utilizing both 
multilateral and bilateral means to these ends. 
 
We argue that central to this Eurasian security treaty complex is CIS nested bilateralism, 
with FSU states crafting both bilateral and multilateral treaties that are complementary as FSU 
security goals are advanced.  The particular interconnections among bilateral and multilateral 
treaties vary, with our analyses of just one bilateral relationship -- that of Russia and 
Turkmenistan -- revealing examples of direct, partial, and anticipatory nesting.  In this Russian-
Turkmenistan case, as in the broader analysis of the CIS using ATOP multilateral security 
alliance data, nested bilateral treaties served to specify and or to implement multilateral security 
arrangements.  At the same time, bilateral treaties could stand alone.  We saw this in the Russian-
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Turkmen case, where specific, more technical tasks were accomplished by a two-party 
agreement.  Likewise, multilateral treaties may stand alone, either because they are complete and 
without a need of greater specification, or because signatory states are unprepared or unwilling to 
more fully implement them via additional treaties.  While our examination here of the FSU-CIS 
case did not include examples of such "stand alone" multilateral treaties, we are already aware of 
examples and will explore them in future research. 
 
Finally, in illuminating the dynamics of FSU-CIS security treaty construction, we offer a 
broader theoretical argument intended to help explain similar patterns in other regions of the 
world and in other substantive areas.  Looking beyond the Eurasian and CIS setting, post-Cold 
War treaty construction has entailed an array of new bilateral and multilateral agreements that 
are interconnected.  In the security domain, many such agreements are part of some regional 
security or economic institution, and they depart from the classic, realist power type to focus on 
inter-member conflict management.  Such "conflict-management alliances" are highly conducive 
to nested bilateralism, and we anticipate that the developments we have illuminated in the FSU-
CIS case also characterize those in other regionally defined treaty complexes. Thus, we conclude 
that there is considerable evidence pointing to the bilateral-multilateral nexus as key to 
understanding how international institutions -- as treaty complexes -- function in the 
contemporary world system. 
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Table 1.  Number of Created Multilateral and Bilateral Alliance Treaties, 1810s-2000s 
 
 
World USA Russia Decade 
Total % Bilat. Total % Bilat. Total % Bilat. 
1810s 8 0.62 0 0.00 1 0.00 
1820s 1 0.00 0 0.00 1 0.00 
1830s 11 0.73 0 0.00 6 0.67 
1840s 7 0.57 0 0.00 2 0.50 
1850s 16 0.56 0 0.00 1 1.00 
1860s 16 0.69 0 0.00 1 1.00 
1870s 9 0.89 0 0.00 3 0.67 
1880s 8 0.25 0 0.00 2 0.50 
1890s 5 1.00 0 0.00 3 1.00 
1900s 11 0.82 1 1.00 3 1.00 
1910s 18 0.78 0 0.00 6 0.50 
1920s 40 0.9 1 1.00 6 0.83 
1930s 46 0.76 0 0.00 15 0.93 
1940s 58 0.81 7 0.14 16 0.81 
1950s  36 0.75 10 0.8 2 0.50 
1960s 53 0.83 3 0.67 7 0.86 
1970s 60 0.9 4 0.75 18 0.95 
1980s 37 0.81 1 1.00 3 1.00 
1990s 188 0.96 1 1.00 37 0.92 
2000s 20 0.85 0 0.00 5 1.00 
 
 13 
Table 2.  Post-Cold War Multilateral Alliances and Regional Economic Institutions (REIs) 
 
 
REI Common name of treaty Year Signatories of treaty 
European Union (EU) Maastricht Treaty 1992 All EU countries 
Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) 
Collective Security Treaty 1992 CIS members minus Georgia, Moldova, 
Turkmenistan and Ukraine 
Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) 
CIS Charter 1993 All CIS members 
European Union (EU) Treaty of Good Neighborliness, 
Friendship and Cooperation (non-
aggression  treaty) 
1993 Andorra, France and Spain 
Presently negotiating a free 
trade agreement with other 
south-eastern European 
countries (9 members) 
Dayton Accords 1995 Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Croatia and Yugoslavia 
Caribbean Community 
(CARICOM) 
Caribbean Common Market 1996 Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts/Nevis, 
Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, 
Barbados 
Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO) 
Agreement on deepening military 
trust in border regions 
1996 China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan 
Southern African 
Development Community 
(SADC) 
Alliance treaty 1999 Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Namibia and Zimbabwe 
Common Market of 
Eastern and Southern 
African States (COMESA) 
Economic Community of Central 
African States 
2000 Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African 
Republic, Congo,  Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Sao Tome-Principe, Gabon, Equatorial 
Guinea, Rwanda and Chad 
Arab League, Gulf 
Cooperation Council 
(GCC) 
Gulf Cooperation Council 2000 Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia  
United Arab Emirates 
Southern African 
Development Community 
(SADC) 
Southern Africa Development 
Community 
2001 Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius,  
Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, 
South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania,  
Zambia and Zimbabwe 
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Table 3:  Security Issues Addressed by CIS Security Treaties, 1992-2004 
 
 
         N of Treaties 
Issue         Addressing Issue*    Earliest Latest 
 
Terrorism      13        1992   2004 
Conventional Weapons and Small Arms  12        1992   1998 
Interstate War      10        1992   2003 
Ethnic Conflict       8        1992   1996 
Territorial Disputes       7        1993   2001 
Biological and Chemical Weapons     6        1992   1998 
Intrastate War         6        1992   2003 
Nuclear Weapons       5        1992   1995 
Drug Trafficking       3        1995   1998 
Immigration        2        1995   1998 
Natural Disasters       2        1992   1998 
Disease        1        1998 
 
Treaties with no specific substantive focus  21 
 
Total N of Treaties     53 
 
 
* Treaty numbers do not total to 53 because many treaties addressed multiple security 
issues. 
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Appendix:  Nested Bilateralism Coding Manual 
 
 
 This coding scheme follows from the definition of the nested bilateralism that is given in 
the paper (we refer to treaty B as nested within treaty A in order to simplify explanations): 
 
1.  Treaty B implementing or specifying another treaty A is nested within that treaty A. 
 
2.  Treaty A with stronger requirements compared to treaty B means that treaty B is nested 
within treaty A. 
 
 
The rules that we use to identify nested bilateralism: 
 
1.  Both treaties, A and B, should use similar language describing specific security issues raised.  
 
2.  Both treaties, A and B, should have at least one common issue. 
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